With the Greece vote confirmed last night for a “No”, what’s going to happen to the markets? Well in short, a decline without a doubt will affect most equity markets, but I have my doubts that we’ll see the 5-10% drop that occurred in 2011. In the end this wonderful story of capitalism in Greece isn’t over and it’ll be interesting to see how this all unfolds in the coming days, months and years.

Now for a more intellectual list of outcomes, see below for El-Erian’s latest post on Bloomberg.

1. The victory of the “No” camp — with more than 60 percent of the vote, according to preliminary returns — will initially lead to a general selloff in global equities, along with price pressures on the bonds issued by Greece, other peripheral euro zone economies and emerging markets. German and U.S. government bonds will benefit from a flight to quality.

2. Having been caught off guard, European politicians will urgently seek to regain the initiative: Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Francois Hollande of France will meet in Paris on Monday to work on a response. In a perfect world, these leaders would move quickly and effectively with the Greek government to get past the conflict and acrimony that preceded the referendum. This is likely to be difficult, given the mistrust, bad blood and damaging accusations that have poisoned the relationship.

3. Even with those challenges, Greek and European politicians don’t have much time to get their act together. The horrid conditions in Greece will get a lot worse before they improve. Without huge emergency assistance from the European Central Bank — a decision that faces long odds — the government will find it hard to get money to the country’s automated teller machines, let alone re-open the banks.

4. As hoarding increases, shortages of goods, including fuel and food, will intensify. Capital and payments controls will be tightened. The economy will take another worrisome step down, worsening unemployment and poverty. And the government will struggle to pay pensioners and the salaries of civil servants.

5. As a result, the government will be under mounting pressure to issue some type of IOUs to maintain a sense of a functioning economy. If it does, the IOUs will take on the role of a parallel currency, quoted domestically at a discount to the single currency.

6. Outside Greece, a lot of thought will be given to limiting adverse spillovers. The ECB will most likely have to roll out new measures to contain regional contagion, including expanding the current program of large-scale purchases of securities. This will weaken the euro’s exchange rate. In addition, together with theInternational Monetary Fund — to which Greece is already in arrears — officials will be preparing for serial Greek defaults.  

7. All parties involved will find themselves slipping into their Plan B mode. This transition will probably be much more traumatic for Greece than for the rest of Europe.

8. With the ultimate goal of countering as quickly as possible the likelihood of further human suffering, pain and uncertainty, Europe has the instruments and institutions to limit contagion and maintain the integrity of the euro zone. But this will require ECB action to be coupled with measures by the European Stability Mechanism and the European Investment Bank aimed at completing a banking union and making progress on fiscal integration.

9. It is quite doubtful, however, that Greece will be able to restore its status as a full member of the euro zone. Indeed, without very skillful crisis management, it is at high risk of becoming a failed state. Rather than just stand by, Europe needs to ensure that Greece’s exit from the 19-member euro zone doesn’t also result in its dissociation from the larger European Union. This could involve special membership in an association agreement, for example,

10. Finally, expect an explosion of blame. This unproductive activity may end up delaying Europe’s urgent need to internalize the lessons from this sad outcome: A series of broken reform promises by several Greek governments was made worse by political stubbornness, poor analysis and inconsistent follow-through by Europe, which is contributing to the loss of Greece as a functioning member of the family.

Source: Bloomberg

  1. Thai bank NPL’s? As always, it’s a relative thing: this time–to the day–18 years ago, Thai banks were instantly broke. The previous day, the then Minister of Finance promised there would be no flotation of the baht. On the 7th, he floated it. It is difficult to describe the zeitgeist surrounding “banking” at that time–they were borrowing cheap and short in USD, lending long here, there was no end to the money.

    Always a good idea to check on how old bank managers were in ’97. They got burnt well and truly and, in comparison to their more youthful American and European counterparts at least, will never forget. Ergo, Thai character being what it is–alas, this includes caving into pressure from VIP’s, as at SCB–most banks are pretty well covered, particularly compared to the famous “IMF” days. And they continue to track it and worry over it.

    Bad debt now chiefly resides in the private sector. This is preferable to busted banks and a seized-up financial system. But this debt level, which is historically non-traditional except for gambling and loan sharking, will have its way in those sectors vulnerable to consumer spending. Obviously, it already has and it takes Time to work through this. Alas.

    Meanwhile, back in Greeeece, 555, the latest from a Nobel Prize winner.

    http://www.cnbc.com/id/102811409?__source=google%7Ceditorspicks%7C&par=google&google_editors_picks=true

    “When you see blood in the streets: Buy.”

    • I agree, I have compared the financials of the large blue chips banks in the late 90s, mid 00s and this year…

      Fundamentally, these banks are as strong as they have ever been and have built up enough of a cushion to weather a significant downturn…In the short term you will take some pain with reduced EPS and dividends, but in the long run these are solid investments for the future.

      • I try and avoid anything described as “safe”. No idea why but it’s akin to hearing political leaders say “remain calm” in the face of danger…

        • Why, Jay, that sounds–dare I say it?–contrarian. At the time of the bust, banks could not have been more safe. Therefore, may I respectfully suggest that, in lieu of “safety,” we look for…Paranoia?

        • Safe is a relative term, especially in times of turmoil…I still believe blue chip banks are about as safe as they come in regards to investing in Thailand, if the banks here have failed I bet your bottom dollar, the Thai government would also have failed as well as the baht becoming worthless (Greece anyone).

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